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The scope of mandatory minimum sentences for various offences 
continues to grow in Canada. Yet, challenges to their constitutionality 
using section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 the 
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment or treatment, have 
almost consistently failed. While this trend may have changed direction 
with the decision in R. v. Smickle,2 discussed below, it is too soon for 
complacency. Distracted by the methodological problems of reasonable 
hypotheticals and constitutional exemptions, “cruel and unusual” 
jurisprudence has been distilled around the notion of gross dispropor-
tionality tied to the limited standard of outraging “standards of decency”. 
As a result, the discourse around section 12 has been truncated and has 
lost the potential richness that the various opinions in the seminal case of 
R. v. Smith3 seemed to portend at the time. If the section 12 jurisprudence 
remains stuck in that narrow analytical mold, there is little reason to 
think that it will provide a useful tool for scrutinizing mandatory mini-
mum sentences. 
In this paper I want to develop the argument that the concept of arbi-
trariness can play a central role in assessing the constitutionality of 
sentencing legislation. First, if we go back to Smith, as Justice Malloy 
did in Smickle,4 we will find dimensions within the “cruel and unusual” 
                                                                                                             
 Faculty of Law, Queen’s University. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11. 
2 [2012] O.J. No. 612, 280 C.C.C. (3d) 365 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Smickle”]. 
3 [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Smith”]. 
4 Supra, note 2. 
174 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
debate which have particular resonance to the issue of mandatory 
minimum sentences and may be more analytically useful than the 
outraging “standards of decency” test. One concept is arbitrariness. 
Second, if there seems to be no room to re-instate arbitrariness into 
section 12 jurisprudence, the same concept has made headway in recent 
section 7 cases dealing with a variety of public law issues. Ultimately, I 
argue that the constitutional validity of mandatory minimum sentences 
should be based on a new, carefully tailored standard, which might be 
called arbitrary disproportionality. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT GETS DISTRACTED 
While the basic test of “gross disproportionality” has remained in 
place, the Supreme Court of Canada has adopted a very high standard for 
a section 12 declaration of invalidity, the outraging “standards of de-
cency” test. However, we have not arrived at this place by thoughtful 
reflection on the purposes and scope of section 12 and the “cruel and 
unusual” concept. Instead, we are here essentially by default. Look, for 
example, at the concept of equality which had its genesis in the creative 
analysis offered in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia,5 but then 
developed through a series of cases which built on the evolving apprecia-
tion of the purposes and effects of section 15, and its practical implemen-
tation as a robust constitutional norm.6 Instead, section 12 cases did not 
build on the various Smith opinions, but concentrated on methodological 
issues to the detriment of the potential richness of the “cruel and un-
usual” concept. When dealing with section 12, the majority of the 
Supreme Court has acted like a couple who sits down to plan next 
summer’s driving trip. Rather than focusing on where they could go, they 
debate the merits of renting a vehicle over using the family car. By the 
time the summer comes, they have become so embroiled in the vehicular 
issue that they have not explored the raft of available directions and 
interesting destinations. Alas, they make the perfunctory decision to 
drive down the 401 Highway to their usual spot, Montreal — a good 
choice, but a simple choice. The vehicle issue distracted them from the 
                                                                                                             
5 [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.). 
6 See Miron v. Trudel, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 (S.C.C.); Egan v. Cana-
da, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.); Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 
42, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.); Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 
S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.); R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 
(S.C.C.); Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396 (S.C.C.). 
(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) ARBITRARY DISPROPORTIONALITY 175 
more intriguing, albeit complex, alternatives. So it has been with the 
Supreme Court, or at least most of its judges, in the cases of R. v. Goltz,7 
R. v. Morrisey8 and R. v. Ferguson.9 Thinking too much about how to get 
there, they deprived themselves of the opportunities to think about where 
they wanted to go. 
The majority decisions in Goltz and Morrisey became mired in the 
question of what is a “reasonable hypothetical”, even though this issue 
did not flow directly from the earlier Supreme Court decision in Smith.10 
The majority of judges in Smith held that Edward Dewey Smith had 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 5(2) of the Narcotic 
Control Act11 which imposed a minimum seven-year sentence for 
importing narcotics. Mr. Smith had returned to Canada from South 
America with “seven and a half ounces of 85 to 90 per cent pure cocaine 
secreted on his person”.12 The trial judge found the impugned seven-year 
minimum sentence to be unconstitutional given the potential dispropor-
tionality of the mandatory sentence in light of “the range of offences, the 
variety of ways the offence may be committed, and the great disparity of 
the sentence with that imposed on others who have committed offences 
identical in gravity and nature”.13 With his sentencing discretion freed 
from the mandatory minimum, he then sentenced Mr. Smith to eight 
years imprisonment. Clearly, the particular circumstances of Mr. Smith 
and his offence did not support a “cruel and unusual” claim. By giving 
Mr. Smith standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 5(2), the 
majority of the Supreme Court held that the case could be argued by 
reference to the range of conduct which section 5(2) encompassed. While 
hypothetical examples were used to support the reasoning, the majority 
did not introduce the concept of a reasonable hypothetical as the requisite 
platform for a section 12 challenge not based on the particular circum-
stances of the litigant. 
Looking specifically at Smith and the issue of standing, we should 
remember that we are examining the very early years of Charter juris-
prudence when the Supreme Court was understandably confronted by a 
number of important and difficult interpretive, definitional, methodologi-
                                                                                                             
7 [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Goltz”]. 
8 [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morrisey”]. 
9 [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ferguson”]. 
10 Supra, note 3. 
11 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1. 
12 Supra, note 3, at para. 6. 
13 Id., at para. 16. 
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cal and procedural Charter issues. Less than ten months before Smith was 
argued, the Supreme Court released its decision in R. v. Big M Drug Mart 
Ltd.14 which held that a corporation could challenge the constitutionality 
of a legislative provision on the basis that it violated the Charter’s 
guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion. In so doing, Dickson 
C.J.C. stated: 
Any accused, whether corporate or individual, may defend a 
criminal charge by arguing that the law under which the charge is 
brought is constitutionally invalid. Big M is urging that the law under 
which it has been charged is inconsistent with s. 2(a) of the Charter and 
by reason of s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, it is of no force or 
effect. 
Whether a corporation can enjoy or exercise freedom of religion is 
therefore irrelevant. The respondent is arguing that the legislation is 
constitutionally invalid because it impairs freedom of religion — if the 
law impairs freedom of religion it does not matter whether the company 
can possess religious belief. An accused atheist would be equally 
entitled to resist a charge under the Act.15 
In other words, an arguable case of constitutional infirmity can be raised 
by a party even if the party’s own factual situation does not support the 
claim. 
The Smith Court included Dickson C.J.C. and three other justices 
who sat on Big M. In Smith, the dissenting opinion of McIntyre J. 
expressed great concern about Smith’s standing to argue unconstitution-
ality. In observing that “there is an air of unreality about this appeal”,16 
he characterized the claim in these terms: 
... the imposition of “a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years” 
on a hypothetical “first time importer of a single marijuana cigarette” 
would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In effect, the appellant 
is stating that while the law is not unconstitutional in its application to 
him, it may be unconstitutional in its application to a third party and, 
therefore, should be declared of no force or effect [because the question 
of cruel and unusual punishment, under s. 12 of the Charter, does not 
appear to arise on the facts of the case]”.17 
                                                                                                             
14 [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.). 
15 Id., at paras. 39-40. 
16 Supra, note 3, at para. 78. 
17 Id.  
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Justice McIntyre concluded that this was not a sound approach to section 
12 litigation which should be restricted to cases where the punishment in 
question is arguably “cruel and unusual” and not extended to a claim 
based on “some hypothetical third party”.18 Curiously, this dissenting 
view became the genesis of the “reasonable hypothetical” debate that 
arose in subsequent cases. 
It is important to note that McIntyre J. did recognize the utility of 
permitting a challenge to laws even if the claimant’s own rights are not 
affected in situations where leaving a matter unresolved cast a “chilling 
effect” on legal activities.19 In essence, he was saying that there is a 
public interest in permitting expeditious litigation especially where 
people actually affected may not easily be able to litigate. Using the 
threshold of impact on legal activities may seem appealing but it is 
misleading. There are other relevant pubic interest values which may 
come into play. Importantly, Lamer J., for the majority, rejected the 
Crown’s claim that prosecutorial discretion kept inappropriate cases 
away from the mandatory minimum but added his concern that the 
mandatory minimum sentence “gives the Crown an unfair advantage in 
plea bargaining as an accused will be more likely to plead guilty to a 
lesser or included offence”.20 In an era in which we are now familiar with 
the reality of wrongful convictions, we cannot dismiss the prospect that 
some innocent people, during the seven-year minimum sentence regime 
for importing, may have been induced to plead guilty to “possession for 
the purposes” with a short jail sentence to avoid the risk of an importing 
conviction and the mandatory minimum sentence. Accordingly, permit-
ting expeditious litigation challenging a mandatory minimum sentence 
promotes justice and fairness values akin to McIntyre J.’s “chilling 
effect” argument.21 Put in this context, perhaps even McIntyre J. would 
have re-thought his opposition. 
When we look at the majority judgment in Smith, we see that the 
methodological decision to permit the claim to go forward was based on 
the finding that “it is inevitable that, in some cases, a verdict of guilt will 
lead to the imposition of a term of imprisonment which will be grossly 
disproportionate”.22 As Lamer J. succinctly said: it is “the certainty, not 
                                                                                                             
18 Id., at para. 78. 
19 Id., at para. 79. 
20 Id., at para. 72. 
21 This was essentially Le Dain J.’s position on the question of standing: see id., at para. 
120. 
22 Id., at para. 65. 
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just the potential”.23 Clearly, the majority was looking at the range of 
conduct and culpability encompassed by the offence in question given 
the myriad ways in which it could be committed. This was not an 
exercise in imagination but a recognition of the breadth of the offence of 
importing a narcotic combined with the “certainty” that a seven-year 
sentence would be grossly disproportionate, in circumstances included in 
the scope of the offence, to the culpability and circumstances of the 
offender. This is not a conclusion based on a reasonable hypothetical. 
It was only in Goltz where the Supreme Court deviated from this ap-
proach by focusing on the permissible use of the “reasonable hypotheti-
cal”. Recognizing that Smith mandated a section 12 methodology which 
could extend beyond the facts of the claimant’s case, Gonthier J. ob-
served: 
The question is not greeted by an immediate or obvious answer. The 
jurisprudence to date exhibits significant confusion about the use of 
hypothetical examples which may readily demonstrate that in some 
imaginable circumstances a minimum penalty might result in a 
punishment whose effects are grossly or excessively disproportionate to 
the particular wrongdoing in a given case.24 
The reference to “confusion” was a gross exaggeration. The substantive 
criminal law, including Charter standards, explains and delimits the 
range of culpable conduct which can satisfy a given offence. As well, 
looking to the circumstances of the offender, it is inevitable that someone 
will be a young first offender. Accordingly, it was provocative hyperbole 
to talk about “imaginable circumstances”. With this preamble to his 
analysis, Gonthier J. concluded that, beyond the offender’s factual 
context, a section 12 challenge should only proceed “on grounds of gross 
disproportionality as evidenced in reasonable hypothetical circum-
stances, as opposed to far-fetched or marginally imaginable cases”.25 In 
his words: 
A reasonable hypothetical example is one which is not far-fetched or 
only marginally imaginable as a live possibility. While the Court is 
unavoidably required to consider factual patterns other than that 
presented by the respondent’s case, this is not a licence to invalidate 
statutes on the basis of remote or extreme examples. Laws typically 
aim to govern a particular field generally, so that they apply to a range 
                                                                                                             
23 Id., at para. 66. 
24 Supra, note 7, at para. 38. 
25 Id., at para. 42. 
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of persons and circumstances. It is true that this Court has been 
vigilant, wherever possible, to ensure that a proper factual foundation 
exists before measuring legislation against the Charter (Danson v. 
Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086, at p. 1099, and 
MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357, at pp. 361-62). Yet it has 
been noted above that s. 12 jurisprudence does not contemplate a 
standard of review in which that kind of factual foundation is available 
in every instance. The applicable standard must focus on imaginable 
circumstances which could commonly arise in day-to-day life.26 
In contrast, the dissenting judges, including Lamer C.J.C. and McLachlin 
J. (as she then was), who both sat on Smith, would have upheld the lower 
court’s decision which it characterized as “simply saying that when the 
gravity of the offence is considered together with the potential range of 
situations in which offenders may find themselves, a mandatory mini-
mum sentence may prevent the court charged with sentencing from 
reaching a fair result, and indeed require the judge in some cases to 
impose a sentence which is grossly disproportionate.”27 The three 
dissenters appreciated that Smith was based on a range of conduct and 
culpability analysis and did not instruct judges and lawyers to exercise 
their imaginations. 
The extent of the restrictive approach to a “reasonable hypothetical” 
embraced by Goltz became apparent in Morrisey28 in which the Gonthier-
led majority rejected the use of reported decisions as “reasonable 
hypotheticals” because they do not represent circumstances “that could 
commonly arise in day-to-day life”.29 Manslaughter is certainly an 
offence of well-recognized breadth but it is this very breadth which made 
a four-year mandatory minimum sentence open to challenge under 
section 12. Instead, Gonthier J. would only consider two kinds of 
hypotheticals even if they arose from a reported case: 
It appears to me that there are two types of situations that commonly 
arise and which can be gleaned from the reported cases. The first 
involves an individual playing around with a gun. The offender 
unreasonably thinks that the gun will not go off. He aims it at another 
person and discharges it, killing someone. This includes playing 
Russian roulette (Saswirsky, supra, and J.C., supra), and pretending to 
shoot a friend to frighten him (Davis, supra, and Morehouse, supra). 
                                                                                                             
26 Id., at para. 69. 
27 Id., at para. 109. 
28 Supra, note 8. 
29 Id., at paras. 31-33. 
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The second hypothetical situation that arises from the reported cases 
involves a hunting trip gone awry.30 
This must be read in context; Gonthier J. had already made the curi-
ous remark that a reported case might be “one of the ‘marginal’ cases, not 
contemplated by the approach set out in Goltz”.31 Obviously, the “mar-
ginal case” would use its own facts to support the claim of “gross 
disproportionality” and, if successful, the result would be a section 52 
declaration of invalidity. So why is it that the “marginal case” cannot 
support a claim by someone whose own facts do not lead to a “gross 
disproportionality” conclusion? It must have been this recognition which 
led the two dissenters, Arbour and McLachlin JJ., to conclude that “there 
will unavoidably be a case in which a four-year minimum sentence for 
this offence will be grossly disproportionate”.32 This was consistent with 
the real Smith rationale based on looking at the scope of the offence, not 
reasonable hypotheticals. Justice Arbour offered as a potential example a 
case of unlawful act manslaughter where an abused spouse responds to 
her abuser causing his death. Notwithstanding the substantive require-
ment that the act must convey reasonable foresight of bodily harm, it is 
inevitable that there will be other mitigating circumstances which will 
make the four-year mandatory minimum sentence grossly disproportion-
ate. Justice Arbour appreciated the inadequacy of Gonthier J.’s method-
ology and concluded that it will make the question of constitutionality of 
a punishment provision “dependent essentially on timing”: 
It will be upheld until it is challenged in a “marginal” case, or at least 
one that was viewed as too marginal to constitute a reasonable 
hypothetical, but when that case arises, the section will be struck down 
under the first branch of the test in Smith and Goltz, for the benefit, 
presumably, of all subsequent cases.33 
Still, in the end, both Arbour and McLachlin JJ. would have dismissed 
the appeal advocating that, in future criminal negligence manslaughter 
cases, the mandatory minimum would be “applicable in all cases save 
those in which it would be unconstitutional to do so”.34 This sounds very 
close to supporting a constitutional exemption, which leads us directly to 
                                                                                                             
30 Id., at paras. 51-52. 
31 Id., at para. 32. 
32 Id., at para. 82. 
33 Id., at para. 89. 
34 Id., at para. 94. 
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the last methodological case which distracted the Supreme Court’s “cruel 
and unusual” attention. 
In Ferguson,35 the Supreme Court unanimously held that constitu-
tional exemptions should not be an available remedy in section 12 cases. 
Courts have only two options: strike down the legislation or uphold its 
constitutionality. For the Court, McLachlin C.J.C. based the rejection of 
exemptions on four considerations: (1) the weight of lower court authori-
ties; (2) the availability of a constitutional exemption contradicted 
Parliament’s intention to limit sentencing discretion; (3) distinctions in 
the intended remedial scope of section 24(1) and section 24(2) of the 
Charter; and (4) exemptions undermine the rule of law and its intrinsic 
values of certainty, accessibility, intelligibility, clarity and predictability. 
Without commenting on this reasoning which was developed in detail, it 
is clear that Ferguson put to rest the constitutional exemption option in 
section 12 cases. However, on the “cruel and unusual” issue, the decision 
in this case illustrates how arid that analysis had become: 
The test for whether a particular sentence constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment is whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate: 
R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045. As this Court has repeatedly held, to 
be considered grossly disproportionate, the sentence must be more than 
merely excessive. The sentence must be “so excessive as to outrage 
standards of decency” and disproportionate to the extent that Canadians 
“would find the punishment abhorrent or intolerable”: R. v. Wiles, 
[2005] 3 S.C.R. 895, 2005 SCC 84, at para. 4, citing Smith, at p. 1072 
and Morrisey, at para. 26.36 
This is the distillation of “cruel and unusual” analysis after Goltz, 
Morrisey and Ferguson. The broader dimensions of “gross dispropor-
tionailty” have been reduced to the high threshold of outraging standards 
of decency and its rhetorical siblings, abhorrent or intolerable punish-
ment or treatment. Even the intervening cases of R. v. Lyons37 and R. v. 
Luxton,38 neither of which raised methodological issues, did not address 
the concept of arbitrariness but restricted their analysis to the effects of 
the punishment within a “rational” sentencing system. But has the 
Supreme Court rejected the richness of Smith, including its discussions 
of arbitrariness, or simply neglected it? 
                                                                                                             
35 Supra, note 9. 
36 Id., at para. 14. 
37 [1987] S.C.J. No. 62, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lyons”]. 
38 [1990] S.C.J. No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Luxton”]. 
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III. SMITH AND THE CONCEPT OF ARBITRARINESS 
Consistently, the Supreme Court has recognized the seminal nature 
of the Smith decision and the depth of its historical, contextual and 
comparative analysis. Accordingly, it is necessary to mine the various 
opinions for those concepts or factors which may remain relevant and 
worthy of attention. The judgment of Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer J., 
(written by Lamer J.) was the longest and most careful of the five 
opinions. It makes some important preliminary points about section 12 
which have remained uncontroverted. First, the phrase “cruel and 
unusual” is a “compendious expression of a norm”.39 Second, the 
constitutionality analysis starts with an inquiry into the validity of the 
purpose of the legislative provision but extends into the question of 
whether the means chosen by Parliament have produced effects which 
violate the guarantee.40 Third, the issue is whether the punishment is 
“grossly disproportionate”, and not merely excessive, which can be 
corrected on appeal.41 Fourth, Lamer J. adopted the basic standard 
articulated by Laskin C.J.C. in the Canadian Bill of Rights42 case, R. v. 
Miller:43 “whether the punishment prescribed is so excessive as to 
outrage standards of decency”.44 But the opinion then moved into richer 
territory when it canvassed those factors which may be relevant to that 
assessment. He said: 
... the determination of whether the punishment is necessary to achieve 
a valid penal purpose, whether it is founded on recognized sentencing 
principles, and whether there exist valid alternatives to the punishment 
imposed, are all guidelines which, without being determinative in 
themselves, help to assess whether the punishment is grossly 
disproportionate.45 
Then, he moved on to consider arbitrariness. 
Although he accepted that whether a punishment was arbitrarily im-
posed was one of the factors which Professor Tarnopolsky (as he then 
was) synthesized from various Canadian Bill of Rights cases, Lamer J. 
ultimately reached the influential conclusion that arbitrariness should 
                                                                                                             
39 Supra, note 3, at para. 40. 
40 Id., at paras. 48-50. 
41 Id., at paras. 53-54. 
42 S.C. 1960, c. 44. 
43 [1976] S.C.J. No. 91, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680 (S.C.C.). 
44 Smith, supra, note 3, at para. 40. 
45 Id., at para. 57. 
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only be “a minimal factor in the determination of whether a punishment 
or treatment is cruel and unusual”.46 However, this observation needs to 
be put in context. As was common at the time, many American constitu-
tional cases were submitted to the court. Justice Lamer was building on 
the important views that he expressed in Reference re Motor Vehicle Act 
(British Columbia), s. 94(2)47 that Canadian courts should not follow 
American constitutional jurisprudence when defining Charter rights. In 
Smith, he extended this approach to arbitrariness: 
This reference to the arbitrary nature of the punishment as a factor is a 
direct import into Canada of one of the tests elaborated upon by the 
American judiciary in dealing with the Eighth Amendment of their 
Constitution. Although the tests developed by the Americans provide 
useful guidance, they stem from the analysis of a constitution which is 
different in many respects from the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.48 
Here, it is important to note two things. First, Lamer J. recognized that 
the American jurisprudence stemmed from death penalty cases and was 
skewed by the fact that criminal law is within state jurisdiction. 
Arbitrariness was a central feature in the two major U.S. death pen-
alty cases, the first of which held the death penalty unconstitutional as 
applied, due to its arbitrary imposition. In that case, Furman v. Georgia,49 
the reasoning was spread diffusely over nine separate opinions in a 5-4 
decision. In explaining his view, Stewart J. concluded that those selected 
for execution represented “a capriciously selected random handful” out 
of the eligible set.50 Accordingly, the criteria actually employed must 
have been arbitrary or discriminatory. Subsequently Georgia responded 
by creating aggravating criteria which could justify the death penalty. 
Other states revised their statutes to provide either for mandatory 
schemes or some form of “guided discretion”. In 1976, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the revised Georgia statute was constitutional since it 
provided adequate guidance for a jury to determine whether there was 
justification for imposing the death penalty, thus avoiding the “wanton 
and freakish” application that had existed before.51 Given the prolifera-
tion of new state death penalty laws involving stipulated aggravating 
                                                                                                             
46 Id., at para. 62. 
47 [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at para. 17 (S.C.C.). 
48 Smith, supra, note 3, at para. 60. 
49 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
50 Id., at 309-10. 
51 Gregg v. Georgia, 462 U.S. 153 (1976), especially at 206-207. 
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factors, it was inevitable that the U.S. Supreme Court would face claims 
of unconstitutionality directed at specific factors. In Zant v. Stephens,52 a 
unanimous Court concluded that an aggravating factor needed to perform 
a “constitutionally necessary function” which has been described as 
limiting “the death-eligible class to the most culpable offenders, for 
whom jurors will more consistently deem death sentences to be justi-
fied”.53 While a concern about arbitrariness was at the heart of these 
decisions, Lamer J. was correct that the constitutional analysis was not a 
fruitful ground for our Supreme Court to follow. In American capital 
cases, arbitrariness only related to the imposition of the sentence in order 
to ensure equality under the law.54 
Second, after explaining the distinction between the Charter and U.S. 
constitutional guarantees, in Smith Lamer J. specifically commented on 
arbitrariness by stating that: 
As regards this factor, some comments should be made, because 
arbitrariness of detention and imprisonment is addressed by s. 9, and, to 
the extent that the arbitrariness, given the proper context, could be in 
breach of a principle of fundamental justice, it could trigger a prima 
facie violation under section 7. As indicated above, s. 12 is concerned 
with the effect of a punishment, and, as such, the process by which the 
punishment is imposed is not, in my respectful view, of any great 
relevance to a determination under s. 12.55 
These remarks show that he was addressing arbitrariness only in the 
limited imposition sense but that a broader conception might be devel-
oped under section 7. As discussed later in this paper, he was prescient 
although he did not foresee the potential link between legislative objec-
tives and the effect of a punishment. 
The other opinions in Smith are also informative on the issue of arbi-
trariness. The dissenter, McIntyre J., devoted substantial attention to 
arbitrariness and Le Dain J. concurred with this part of his judgment. 
Justice McIntyre accepted that there are various definitions including 
                                                                                                             
52 462 U.S. 862 (1983). 
53 See the discussion of this case in C.C. Sharon, “The ‘Most Deserving’ of Death: The 
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46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 223, at 230-32.  
54 It is also important to note that American “cruel and unusual” jurisprudence has evolved 
to provide an analytical framework for categorical challenges to both capital and non-capital 
sentences: see, for example, Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010), in which a majority held that 
it was unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile to life without parole in a non-capital case. For a useful 
critique, see “The Supreme Court, 2009 Term” (2010) 124:1 Harv. L. Rev. 209-19. 
55 Supra, note 3, at para. 59. 
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“capricious”, “frivolous”, “unreasonable”, “unjustified” and “not 
governed by rules or principles”.56 He accepted that arbitrariness would 
be relevant to a section 12 challenge in situations where “the legislation 
on its face could impose punishment in an arbitrary manner” or “a body 
empowered to impose punishment could, in practice, impose the pun-
ishment arbitrarily”.57 However, he rejected entirely any inquiry into 
legislative rationale. In his view, courts needed to defer to the reasoning 
of Parliament and concluded: 
I agree with Lambert J. [sic] in the Court of Appeal that this is not a 
matter which can properly be considered by the courts. As he stated, “it 
is not for the courts to consider whether political decisions are wise or 
rational, or to sit in judgment on the wisdom of legislation or the 
rationality of the process by which it is enacted. That is for Parliament 
and the Legislatures ... The courts are confined to deciding whether the 
legislation enacted by the parliamentary process is constitutional.”58 
While this may have been an attractive posture for some judges in 1987, 
it no longer holds water in modern Charter analysis. The wisdom of 
legislation may be beyond Charter scrutiny but statutes which impose 
burdens or create distinctions must conform with Charter norms. 
Like Lamer J., Wilson J. also looked at arbitrariness as it related to 
the imposition of the punishment but took a more expansive view of 
when imposition would be arbitrary: 
I disagree, however, with Lamer J. that the arbitrary nature of the 
minimum sentence under s. 5(2) of the Act is irrelevant to its 
designation as “cruel and unusual” under s. 12. On the contrary, I 
believe it is quite fundamental. A seven-year sentence for drug 
importation is not per se cruel and unusual. It may be very well 
deserved and completely appropriate. It is the fact that the seven-year 
sentence must be imposed regardless of the circumstances of the 
offence or the circumstances of the offender that results in its being 
grossly disproportionate in some cases and therefore cruel and unusual 
in those particular cases. The concept of “the fit sentence” to which I 
made reference in my concurring reasons in the Re B.C. Motor Vehicle 
Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, as basic to modern day theories of 
punishment is effectively, precluded by the mandatory minimum in 
s. 5(2). Judicial discretion to impose a shorter sentence if circumstances 
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warrant is foreclosed and the inevitable result is a legislatively ordained 
grossly disproportionate sentence in some cases.59 
This remark shows her concern that a mandatory minimum sentence may 
compel an unconstitutional sentence and, accordingly, violate section 12 
by producing a “legislatively ordained grossly disproportionate sen-
tence”. Justice La Forest concurred with Lamer J. but, in a brief opinion, 
indicated that he preferred “not to say anything about the role of arbi-
trariness in determining whether there has been cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment”.60 
To summarize, in Smith, we see that McIntyre, Le Dain and Wilson 
JJ. supported a robust role for arbitrariness in section 12 litigation 
although their views were incipient and in need of development. Justice 
La Forest expressly declined from commenting on the issue. While 
Lamer J. and Dickson C.J.C. would only give arbitrariness a “minimal” 
role, they were dealing with a limited conception of arbitrariness and also 
remarked that a better home for the concept might be within section 7. 
After Smith, the concept of arbitrariness within section 12 was dis-
patched by Gonthier J. in one sentence in Goltz by referring to Lamer J.’s 
“minimal factor” comment.61 Consequently, the concept of arbitrariness 
did not appear in Morrisey or Ferguson. So much for the potential 
richness of arbitrariness as a constitutional factor within section 12. 
IV. ARBITRARINESS UNDER SECTION 7 
Of course, arbitrariness plays a role in the rational connection aspect 
of the R. v. Oakes62 test, but this is part of the section 1 justificatory 
stage. The question is whether arbitrariness can also play a role in the 
Charter violation analysis, before getting to section 1. With very little 
discussion, there are brief passages in Smith, Lyons and Luxton which 
allude to a potential claim under section 7 that could be pursued on the 
basis that the legislative provision in question did not pursue a legitimate 
penological objective or, at least, did not do so rationally.63 But these 
were only hints. The emergence of arbitrariness as part of the “principles 
of fundamental justice” under section 7 can be traced back to R. v. 
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Morgentaler64 and Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General),65 
two cases dealing with the constitutionality of controversial Criminal 
Code66 offences, abortion and assisted suicide respectively. In Rodriguez, 
both the majority decision written by Sopinka J. and the dissent of 
McLachlin and L’Heureux-Dube JJ. addressed this issue. In dissent, 
McLachlin J. said: 
Without defining the entire content of the phrase “principles of 
fundamental justice”, it is sufficient for the purposes of this case to note 
that a legislative scheme which limits the right of a person to deal with 
her body as she chooses may violate the principles of fundamental 
justice under section 7 of the Charter if the limit is arbitrary. A 
particular limit will be arbitrary if it bears no relation to, or is 
inconsistent with, the objective that lies behind the legislation. This was 
the foundation of the decision of the majority of this Court in 
Morgentaler ...67 
Responding to this proposition, Sopinka J., who found no section 7 
violation, also referred to Morgentaler and held: 
Where the deprivation of the right in question does little or nothing to 
enhance the state’s interest (whatever it may be), it seems to me that a 
breach of fundamental justice will be made out, as the individual’s 
rights will have been deprived for no valid purpose ... It follows that 
before one can determine that a statutory provision is contrary to 
fundamental justice, the relationship between the provision and the 
state interest must be considered. One cannot conclude that a particular 
limit is arbitrary because (in the words of my colleague, McLachlin J. 
at pp. 619-20) “it bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the 
objective that lies behind the legislation” without considering the state 
interest and the societal concerns which it reflects.68 
Justice McLachlin concluded that the distinction which the law draws 
between suicide and assisted suicide, making one legal and the other a 
criminal offence, rendered the legislative scheme arbitrary in violation of 
section 7. An able-bodied person can legally take their own life but one 
who is not physically able must enlist help to end their life, thereby 
engaging an illegal act. In her view, no societal interest was offered 
which could justify this distinction. 
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Subsequently, in non-criminal cases, the concept of arbitrariness has 
been given more attention, and more depth. In Chaoulli v. Quebec 
(Attorney General),69 the Supreme Court was confronted with a complex 
record, a controversial issue and a multi-layered constitutional analysis. 
The issue was the constitutionality of the Quebec legislation prohibiting 
private health-care delivery. Four justices held that the prohibition 
violated the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms70 and three 
(McLachlin C.J.C., Major and Bastarache JJ.) also held that it violated 
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on arbitrari-
ness grounds. The dissenting judgment, representing the views of Binnie, 
LeBel and Fish JJ. rejected the finding of a section 7 violation arguing 
that in so doing their colleagues had expanded the net of arbitrariness by 
changing the test from “inconsistent” to “unnecessary”.71 Accordingly, on 
the arbitrariness issue there is no clear majority. Moreover, an assessment 
of the disagreement requires a careful parsing of the McLachlin C.J.C. 
decision and an examination of the record to determine whether an 
expansion actually occurred. 
However, the discussions of “arbitrariness” are worthy of note. Chief 
Justice McLachlin observed that a respondent to a claim of arbitrariness 
must show more than a theoretical connection to the relevant state 
objective, but must show a “real connection on the facts”.72 With respect 
to the actual test, she said: 
... whether the measure is arbitrary in the sense of bearing no real 
relation to the goal and hence being manifestly unfair. The more 
serious the impingement on the person’s liberty and security, the more 
clear must be the connection.73 
She observed that “common sense” arguments can amount to no more 
than assertions of belief and, in order to defeat claims of arbitrariness, the 
connection must be grounded in fact.74 Here, she proceeded to look at 
evidence of the practises in other western democracies and concluded 
that this refuted “the government’s theoretical contention that a prohibi-
tion on private insurance is linked to maintaining quality public health 
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care”.75 For Binnie and LeBel JJ. (with Fish J. concurring) the test for 
arbitrariness should be approached in three steps: 
(i) what is the “state interest” to be protected? 
(ii) what is the relationship between the “state interest” thus identified 
and the prohibition against private health insurance? 
(iii) have the appellants established that the prohibition bears no 
relation to, or is inconsistent with, the state interest?76 
This might be described as the narrow view of arbitrariness. 
More recently, the concept of arbitrariness was relevant to the 
unanimous 2011 decision of the Supreme Court in the Canada (Attorney 
General) v. PHS Community Services Society case, commonly known as 
the Insite case.77 Insite is a safe injection clinic where medical help is 
provided to intravenous drug users. When it opened in 2003, it had an 
exemption from the federal Minister of Health which insulated it from 
the prohibitions in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.78 In 2008, 
the Minister refused to renew the exemption. A number of constitutional 
issues and arguments arose in this case. I will only look at the treatment 
of arbitrariness as an element of the analysis under section 7 of the 
Charter. Here, the Court needed to address the purposes of the CDSA and 
held that they were twofold: the protection of public health and the 
maintenance of public safety. Chief Justice McLachlin stated that the 
“Minister cannot simply deny an application for a s. 56 exemption on the 
basis of policy simpliciter; insofar as it affects Charter rights, his deci-
sion must accord with the principles of fundamental justice.79 The Court 
accepted the trial judge’s findings that exempting Insite from the prohibi-
tion against possessing narcotics not only “does not undermine the 
objectives of public health and safety, but furthers them”.80 In applying 
the concept of arbitrariness, she concluded: 
The jurisprudence on arbitrariness is not entirely settled. In Chaoulli, 
three justices (per McLachlin C.J. and Major J.) preferred an approach 
that asked whether a limit was “necessary” to further the state 
objective: paras. 131-32. Conversely, three other justices (per Binnie 
and LeBel JJ.), preferred to avoid the language of necessity and instead 
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approved of the prior articulation of arbitrariness as where “[a] 
deprivation of a right ... bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the 
state interest that lies behind the legislation”: para. 232. It is 
unnecessary to determine which approach should prevail, because the 
government action at issue in this case qualifies as arbitrary under both 
definitions.81 
This statement is significant in two ways. First, it represents the views of 
a unanimous court. Second, it leaves open for another day the resolution 
of a divide on the basic conception of the arbitrariness test. 
Another important arbitrariness decision was the 2012 Ontario Court 
of Appeal decision in Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General)82 which 
resulted in the holding that two prostitution-related offences in the 
Criminal Code were unconstitutional. The case was heard by a five-judge 
panel. All five found that sections 210 and 212(1)(j) were unconstitu-
tional but the two dissenting judges would also have found section 
213(1)(c) constitutionally invalid. Here, we are only interested in the 
application of the arbitrariness concept. Quite appropriately, the majority 
of the Court recognized that the section 7 jurisprudence dealing with the 
distinct concepts of arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportional-
ity is in an evolving state. The majority, noting that the “jurisprudence on 
arbitrariness is not entirely settled”83 after Chaoulli, applied the conser-
vative test and posed the basic question as follows: 
When the court considers arbitrariness, it asks whether the challenged 
law bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, its legislative objective. 
Put another way, arbitrariness is established where a law deprives a 
person of his or her section 7 rights for no valid purpose: Rodriguez, at 
pp. 594-595.84 
Using “inconsistency” as the test, the Court agreed with the lower court 
decision of Himel J. that the bawdy house provisions could not be 
characterized as arbitrary since they were directed to some legitimate 
social harms and, accordingly, were consistent with the legislative 
objectives.85 With respect to living off the avails, the Court concluded 
that the provision was not arbitrary: 
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In prohibiting persons from living on the earnings of prostitutes, the 
legislation prevents the exploitation of prostitutes and, in particular, 
prevents pimps from profiting from prostitution. The legislation may be 
overbroad, a matter to which we will turn shortly, because it captures 
activity that is not exploitative, but that is not the same as 
arbitrariness.86 
This thoughtful yet controversial decision, obviously headed to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, permits us to make two observations about 
arbitrariness. First, the Supreme Court jurisprudence compels a more 
refined look at this important standard, especially in terms of distinguish-
ing it from other related section 7 concepts. Second, like other section 7 
arguments, in any case where it is raised, arbitrariness requires a thor-
ough examination of legislative history, judicial interpretations and 
appropriate social science evidence to properly understand the legislative 
objectives which lie behind a statutory provision. 
A different approach to arbitrariness, still relying on the same prece-
dents, can be seen in the dissent of Binnie J. in C. (A.) v. Manitoba 
(Director of Child and Family Services).87 The case involved a 15-year-
old Jehovah’s Witness who had been taken into care after objecting to a 
blood transfusion as part of her treatment for Crohn’s Disease. The 
Director applied for a treatment order that would authorize the medical 
procedure. The presiding judge invoked the statutory “best interests of 
the child” test and granted the order. On appeal, it was argued that the 
statutory scheme was unconstitutional since, if the child had been over 
the age of 16, no treatment order could be made unless the child was 
incapable of understanding relevant information or reasonably appreciat-
ing the foreseeable consequences of the consent decision. On the facts, it 
seemed clear that the child had that capacity. The trial judge concluded 
that capacity was irrelevant. The Court of Appeal considered that, while 
relevant, it was not determinative of the “best interests of the child” test. 
Sitting as a five-judge panel, Abella J. for the majority four justices held 
that the legislative scheme created by the Child and Family Services 
Act88 was “neither arbitrary, discriminatory, nor violative of religious 
freedom”.89 After looking at the objectives of the legislation, the com-
mon law and other jurisdictions, she concluded that the scheme struck an 
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“appropriate balance between achieving the legislative protective goal 
while at the same time respecting the right of mature adolescents to 
participate meaningfully in decisions relating to their medical treatment”.90 
This balance “between autonomy and protection” ensured that the 
scheme was not arbitrary.91 In a separate concurring opinion, McLachlin 
C.J.C. and Rothstein J. held that age “in this context, is a reasonable 
proxy for independence”.92 As a result, they concluded that the scheme 
“reflects the societal reality of how children mature, and the dependence 
of children under 16 on their parents, as well as the difficulty of carrying 
out a comprehensive analysis of maturity and voluntariness ...”.93 
In dissent, Binnie J. posed the questions differently by focusing on 
the class of “mature minors”. His approach flows from his observation 
about the applicable state interest: 
Children may generally (and correctly) be assumed to lack the requisite 
degree of capacity and maturity to make potentially life-defining 
decisions. It is this lack of capacity and maturity that provides the state 
with a legitimate interest in taking the decision-making power away 
from the young person and vesting it in a judge under the CFSA.94 
This led to his conclusion that “s. 25 of the CFSA is unconstitutional 
because it prevents a person under 16 from establishing that she or he 
understands the medical condition and the consequences of refusing 
treatment, and should therefore have the right to refuse treatment 
whether or not the applications judge considers such refusal to be in the 
young person’s best interests”.95 
After a long discussion of personal autonomy, Binnie J. returned to 
the constitutional issue and characterized the legislative scheme as 
creating an irrebuttable presumption of incapacity for a child under 16 
for no valid state purpose. In his analysis, if “the legislative net is cast so 
widely as to impose a legal disability on a class of people in respect of an 
assumed developmental deficiency that demonstrably does not exist in 
their case, it falls afoul of the ‘no valid purpose’ principle referred to by 
Sopinka J. in Rodriguez”.96 On the arbitrariness point, he went back to 
basic principles and reasoned: 
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Arbitrariness is a breach of fundamental justice, and arises where a 
law “bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the objective that lies 
behind [it]”. The no valid state purpose principle requires the 
identification of a public interest said to be advanced by the challenged 
law. The no arbitrariness principle looks at what valid state interests 
are said to be advanced and examines the relationship (if any) between 
the state purpose(s) and the impugned measure.97 
After quoting from Chaouilli, he rephrased his conclusion by explaining 
that in the case at bar the irrebuttable presumption “when applied to 
young persons of capacity has ‘no real relation’ to the legislative goal of 
protecting children who lack such capacity” and, hence, is arbitrary.98 
This illustrates the importance of understanding state interests not just in 
theoretical terms but on the facts of the case, as the majority argued in 
Chaouilli. 
What is especially interesting about this approach is that it flowed 
from Binnie J.’s argument that the presumption of incapacity cannot 
legally be refuted. Whether he was right or wrong on this point, what 
matters is that, in his appreciation of how the scheme operated, a person 
is precluded from showing that, on the facts, the ostensible purpose of 
the scheme does not apply. Here lies the similarity to mandatory mini-
mum sentences. In a particular case, faced with a mandatory minimum 
sentence, an offender is precluded from arguing that the ostensible 
penological objectives have no relevance. In other words, the state 
interest which ostensibly underpins a mandatory minimum sentence is 
premised on a contextual presumption but the offender cannot show that 
the presumption does not apply to her. 
V. RECENT SENTENCING CASES, NUR AND SMICKLE 
Both of these important 2011 trial level decisions paid attention to 
section 12 and arbitrariness as an element of section 7. In R. v. Nur,99 the 
accused pleaded guilty to the offence of carrying a loaded firearm which, 
according to section 95(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, carried a manda-
tory minimum sentence of three years because the Crown proceeded by 
indictment. Curiously, had the Crown proceeded summarily, section 
95(2)(b) provided for a maximum sentence of one year. The sentencing 
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scheme has a gap between one and three years and this gap was the focus 
of various constitutional challenges under section 15 (equality), section 
12 (cruel and unusual punishment) and section 7 (arbitrariness). The 
discrimination claim under section 15, supported by the intervener 
African Canadian Legal Clinic, may have been the most interesting and 
refined argument, but Code J. dismissed it with the conclusion that the 
“fundamental flaw in the s. 15 argument is that the Applicant and the 
Intervener have not established that the discriminatory effect of over-
representation and over-incarceration of blacks, amongst those charged 
with s. 95 offences, is caused by the law itself.”100 Under section 12, 
Code J. applied the Ferguson formulation, whether a punishment is “so 
excessive as to outrage standards of decency” and disproportionate to the 
extent that Canadians “would find the punishment abhorrent or intoler-
able”.101 Looking at the circumstances of the offender and the offence in 
light of sentencing practises for gun-related offences, Code J. was not 
persuaded that “gross disproportionality” could be sustained. At the 
“reasonable hypothetical” stage of the analysis, a number of situations 
were submitted all of which involved a “first offender of good character 
who pleads guilty, who fully admits his mistake and who has no possible 
criminal purpose associated with his possession”.102 
Justice Code accepted the Crown’s argument that the answer to the 
gross disproportionality claim premised on the “reasonable hypotheti-
cals” was the availability of the summary conviction option which would 
preclude the three-year mandatory minimum. He advanced a number of 
reasons for this conclusion.103 However, he cautioned that if in the future, 
“the Crown elects to proceed by indictment in a s. 95 case, based on 
incomplete knowledge of the facts, and a very different case later 
emerges at trial, a s. 12 Charter motion may well succeed at the sentenc-
ing stage of proceedings”.104 
While the reasoning of Code J. on this point reflects his usual atten-
tion to detail and his scrupulous treatment of precedents, it is important 
to pause and consider his conclusion. By saying that the hybrid nature of 
the offence nullifies the hypothetical arguments is he not saying Crown 
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discretion on the election question will usually do the right thing? Can 
reliance on discretion, especially a discretion that is for the most part 
unreviewable, ever be an answer? A similar point was argued by the 
Crown in Smith, where it was submitted that facts that did not warrant a 
seven-year minimum sentence would result in a prosecutor pursuing a 
lesser charge. Justice Lamer rejected this argument by stating: 
In my view the section cannot be salvaged by relying on the 
discretion of the prosecution not to apply the law in those cases where, 
in the opinion of the prosecution, its application would be a violation of 
the Charter. To do so would be to disregard totally s. 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 which provides that any law which is 
inconsistent with the Constitution is of no force or effect to the extent 
of the inconsistency and the courts are duty bound to make that 
pronouncement, not to delegate the avoidance of a violation to the 
prosecution or to anyone else for that matter.105 
While one might argue that Lamer J. in Smith was writing only for 
himself and Dickson C.J.C., this would not be an accurate reading. Only 
six justices participated in the Smith decision.106 In the three concurring 
judgments,107 all justices agreed with Lamer J.’s conclusion that the 
impugned provision violated section 12, including his reasoning on gross 
disproportionality.108 Accordingly, it can fairly be said that a majority of 
the Supreme Court of Canada has already rejected the use of prosecuto-
rial discretion to rebut an alleged section 12 violation. 
With respect to arbitrariness, Code J. described the claim as turning 
“on the fact that there is a two year sentencing ‘gap’ between cases where 
the Crown elects to proceed summarily (which carry a one year maxi-
mum sentence) and cases where the Crown elects to proceed by indict-
ment (which carry a three year minimum sentence)”.109 In section 7 
terms, the claim was that the Crown’s “discretion is arbitrarily con-
strained by the absence of sentences between one year and three years 
which will force the Crown to elect to proceed by indictment in those 
cases where, for example, two years would have been an appropriate 
sentence”.110 To assess this claim, he relied on Rodriguez, R. v. Malmo-
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Levine,111 Chaoulli and A.C. v. Manitoba. As a result, he concluded that 
there was “no valid legislative purpose” behind the two-year gap since 
there inevitably will be cases in which the offender’s culpability falls 
between the two options. He concluded: 
... the two year “gap” is inconsistent with the true legislative purposes 
that underlie s. 95. It severely restricts the flexibility of hybrid 
procedures, it will inevitably lead to unfit sentences in the low and mid-
range of s. 95 cases, and it puts the three year mandatory minimum 
sentence, when proceeding by indictment, at constitutional risk. These 
are all irrational purposes and effects. There is simply no clear 
connection between the legislative goals of the 2008 reforms and the 
two year “gap” in the sentencing scheme. It appears to have been a 
mere legislative oversight, which Parliament would quickly have 
corrected by raising the summary conviction maximum sentence to 
three years, had the oversight been pointed out.112 
While the gap problem may be an anomaly, Code J.’s analysis shows the 
importance of looking at a sentencing issue in terms of the overall goals 
of a sentencing scheme. However, notwithstanding his finding of 
arbitrariness, he denied a remedy on the basis that the constitutional 
defect lay in section 95(2)(b) whereas Mr. Nur was sentenced under 
section 95(2)(a)(i). While this is certainly correct, one might question 
whether, after finding the gap to be arbitrary, it was appropriate to put the 
blame on one end of the spectrum and not both. Every line has two ends 
and if the line between one and three can be characterized as arbitrary 
this is because of the gulf that the line spans and not just one of the end 
points. Nevertheless, Nur is an example of section 7 “arbitrariness” in 
action. 
The decision of Malloy J. in R. v. Smickle113 has deservedly received 
much attention for its careful reasoning and bold stance. The facts are 
unusual. On the day in question, a group of police officers executed a 
search warrant on the apartment of Mr. Smickle’s cousin by breaking in 
the door with a battering ram. The warrant related to the cousin and 
firearms allegations. When the police entered the apartment, instead of 
the cousin, they found Mr. Smickle posing with a loaded handgun for a 
webcam photograph that he posted on his Facebook page. He was 
wearing boxer shorts, a white tank top and sunglasses. He dropped the 
                                                                                                             
111 [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, 179 C.C.C. (3d) 417, at 471 (S.C.C.). 
112 Nur, supra, note 99, at para. 131. 
113 Supra, note 2. 
(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) ARBITRARY DISPROPORTIONALITY 197 
gun and the laptop and was arrested. He was charged with various 
offences in relation to possession of the handgun. Based on available 
information, the Crown elected to proceed by indictment. At Smickle’s 
trial, he denied possessing the firearm but, nonetheless, was convicted of 
possession of a loaded firearm contrary to section 95(1) of the Criminal 
Code, which carries with it a mandatory minimum sentence of three 
years imprisonment for a first offence under section 95(2)(a). The 
sentencing proceeded on the factual basis that Mr. Smickle’s use of the 
gun was as a prop for his photograph which, along with the sunglasses, 
would make him look “cool”. At the time of the offence, Smickle was 27 
years old with no criminal record. He was employed and living in a 
stable relationship with a woman. Like Nur, this case also implicated the 
two-year gap created by section 95(2)(a) and (b). Counsel challenged the 
constitutionality of section 95(2) on both section 12 and section 7 
grounds. 
Justice Malloy’s section 12 analysis represents one of the rare occa-
sions in which a judge goes beyond the “cruel and unusual” platitudes 
and delves into the deeper dimensions of the jurisprudence. She begins 
by looking for those factors that have been recognized as relevant to the 
analysis. From Smith, she finds (1) the gravity of the offence; (2) the 
personal characteristics of the offender; (3) the particular circumstances 
of the case; and (4) the actual effect of the punishment on the offender. 
From Goltz, she adds (5) whether the punishment is necessary to achieve 
a valid penal purpose; (6) whether it is founded on recognized sentencing 
principles; (7) whether there exist valid alternatives to the punishment 
imposed; and (8) whether a comparison with punishments imposed for 
other crimes in the same jurisdiction reveals great disproportion.114 This 
is followed by a curious statement: “It is not entirely clear whether the 
‘grossly disproportionate’ test formulated in Smith was meant to create 
an objective standard for cruel and unusual punishment in place of a 
subjective test based on community values.”115 One would have thought 
that any question of disproportionality, regardless of the degree, must be 
measured by an objective standard. Nonetheless, while it may be difficult 
to understand exactly what she means by using the objective/subjective 
distinction, it is clear that she is attempting to come to grips with the 
community standards concept which often appears as a synonym for 
standards of decency. Perhaps she is suggesting that there are two routes 
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to gross disproportionality: one that looks to community standards (or 
standards of decency) and the other in which the punishment is placed in 
the lens of sentencing principles and practises? Ultimately, she accepts 
the role of community standards but defines it in a way that integrates 
both types of factors: 
Notwithstanding these occasional references in the case law to 
community standards of decency and what would shock the public 
conscience, I remain of the view that the analysis of what constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment is essentially an objective test. To the 
extent that community tolerance is part of that test, it can only be with 
reference to a community fully informed about the philosophy, 
principles and purposes of sentencing as set out in the Criminal Code, 
the rights enshrined in the Charter, and the particular circumstances of 
the case before the court.116 
In so doing, Malloy J. has maintained jurisprudential consistency but also 
refined the role of community standards or standards of decency in a way 
that more meaningfully captures the sentencing question which, beyond 
issues of torture and barbarism, section 12 must encompass. 
After concluding that, absent the mandatory minimum sentence, a 
one-year sentence would be fit and appropriate, she then examined the 
three-year mandatory term from a perspective that integrated the ac-
cepted principles and objectives of sentencing. In the end, she concluded 
that the mandatory minimum would be grossly disproportionate both 
viewed through an “objective test” and whether the public conscience 
would be shocked. She adopted the approach employed by Green J. in R. 
v. Johnson117 and asked whether “a reasonable person knowing the 
circumstances of this case, and the principles underlying both the Charter 
and the general sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code, would 
consider a three-year sentence to be fundamentally unfair, outrageous, 
abhorrent and intolerable”.118 Following this approach was a significant 
development. The reasonably informed standard, used in other legal 
tests,119 is far superior to simply asking judges to imagine an artificial 
public consensus. 
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It is informative to list the various factors which led to this conclusion: 
• The mandatory sentence would be 300 per cent greater than what is 
appropriate. 
• A three-year sentence would put Mr. Smickle directly into the 
federal penitentiary system, usually reserved for seasoned criminals. 
These would be harsh conditions for anyone, but even more so for 
an individual such as Mr. Smickle who had no familiarity or experi-
ence with the penal system. 
• The three-year sentence would jeopardize his personal relationships 
and job prospects. 
• There was no issue of rehabilitation or individual deterrence. 
• The mandatory sentence does comply with recognized sentencing 
principles but is inconsistent with many of the purposes and princi-
ples of sentencing, notably the goal of rehabilitation and the re-
quirement that an individual not be deprived of his liberty if other 
sanctions are available which satisfy the other goals of sentencing. 
• Even if it can be argued that general deterrence is served by the 
mandatory sentence, this cannot justify the imposition of a sen-
tence that is otherwise grossly disproportionate to what an offender 
deserves. 
Looking at this analysis, it is clear that Malloy J. has returned the section 
12 issue to its proper home within the matrix of sentencing principles, 
objectives and factors. This is more appropriate for the assessment of 
mandatory minimum sentences especially those of relatively short 
length, miles away from the extremes of life and indeterminate sentences 
but also a considerable distance from a proportionate sentence. At the 
same time, she has refined the role of “outraging standards of decency” 
to ensure that it is reflective of informed observers who are knowledge-
able about sentencing. 
With respect to the arbitrariness issue, she agreed with the reasoning 
of Code J. in Nur and concluded that “the mandatory minimum, when 
coupled with the one year ceiling for summary conviction proceedings, is 
arbitrary and violates Mr. Smickle’s rights under section 7 of the Char-
ter.”120 The major distinction between Nur and Smickle is that in the 
latter case there was no need to move to a “reasonable hypothetical” 
analysis with all its intrinsic obstacles. Devoid of that distraction, Malloy 
J. was able to re-invest the section 12 analysis with the gravity and 
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richness that it deserves. One can only speculate about how her thought-
ful reasoning will be received by other courts. 
VI. CONCLUSION: ARBITRARY DISPROPORTIONALITY 
From all of the section 12 jurisprudence, it is clear that a successful 
claim must rise to the standard of “gross disproportionality”. The courts 
have consistently said that simple disproportionality is a matter to be 
rectified by appellate courts. However, this does not accommodate the 
case of mandatory minimum sentences where both trial and appellate 
judges are confronted with stipulated mandatory sentences which, in 
their view, might be disproportionate to the culpability and circumstances 
of the offender. Here is where the concept of an “irrebuttable presump-
tion” discussed by Binnie J. in A.C. v. Manitoba121 strikes a chord and 
leads to the concept of arbitrary disproportionality that may be encom-
passed by section 7. 
Going back to Smith, let me address a comment by Lamer J. which 
may be read as precluding this role for section 7. He said: 
While section 7 sets out broad and general rights which often extend 
over the same ground as other rights set out in the Charter, it cannot be 
read so broadly as to render other rights nugatory. If section 7 were 
found to impose greater restrictions on punishment than s. 12 — for 
example by prohibiting punishments which were merely excessive — it 
would entirely subsume s. 12 and render it otiose. For this reason, I 
cannot find that s. 7 raises any rights or issues not already considered 
under s. 12.122 
First, as noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bedford,123 arbitrariness 
was only recognized as a principle of fundamental justice in 1993 in 
Rodriguez and, accordingly, earlier cases ought not to play a role in 
understanding its application. Second, throughout Smith, Lamer J. was 
concerned with the effects of punishment and disavowed the relevance of 
looking to the legislative process. In subsequent years, especially with 
the acceptance of arbitrariness, we have seen the recognition of the need 
for a rational connection between purpose and effect when the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person is engaged. Third, and most impor-
tantly, the argument I am trying to make is not simply about excessive or 
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disproportionate punishments. It is about excessive or disproportionate 
punishments compelled by arbitrary statutory provisions. 
Essentially, the mandatory minimum sentence is an irrebuttable pre-
sumption. It mandates punishment on a presumption of culpability and 
deservedness which cannot be refuted by reference to the actual circum-
stances of the offence and the offender. In a case like Smickle, where the 
distance between a proportionate fit sentence and the mandatory mini-
mum sentence can be characterized as “gross disproportionality”, section 
12 comes into play. But is there no remedy where the distance is shorter? 
Can courts be compelled to impose sentences which they know are not 
appropriate unless they can meet the high threshold of “gross dispropor-
tionality”? 
In these cases, I would argue that the mandatory minimum sentence 
and the irrebuttable presumption that it implies should be subject to an 
arbitrariness analysis under section 7 of the Charter. In other words, the 
question ought to be whether the mandatory minimum sentence creates a 
class of people who will be subjected to a sentence that cannot be 
justified by any sentencing principle or objective. This requires looking 
at the scope of conduct encompassed by the offence and then measuring 
the lower limits of culpability against the ostensible sentencing principles 
and objectives which underpin the legislation. I would return to Chaoulli 
and the holding that a justification cannot be merely theoretical but must 
be grounded in the facts of the case. It is not sufficient to simply refer to 
deterrence or denunciation or incapacitation without showing how and 
why they are relevant to a particular class of offenders. And here, the 
methodology need not be encumbered by any question of a “reasonable 
hypothetical”. So long as the legislated provision carves out a class of 
people for whom the sentence cannot be justified on principled grounds 
then the provision is arbitrary. 
It is important to remember the approach of Lamer J. in Smith. What 
needs to be done is to contemplate the range of conduct and culpability 
which the offence encompasses. For every offence, it is inevitable that 
there will be a young first offender. It is inevitable that an offence will be 
committed at the lowest rung of culpability. The issue is whether, with 
this class in mind, can the mandatory sentence be justified by reference 
to accepted sentencing principles and penological objectives, as found in 
fact and not by a speculative theoretical assertion. Under the rubric of 
“arbitrary disproportionality”, it may be necessary to hear expert evi-
dence about the scope and relevance of various sentencing and penologi-
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cal objectives. But this may be the only way to move from rhetoric to 
fact. 
Longer sentences simply for the sake of longer sentences are anti-
thetical to the principles of fundamental justice. The inability of an 
offender to argue on facts and principled grounds that a punishment is 
undeserved does not conform with basic fairness which is intrinsic to our 
common law tradition. Without a Charter concept like “arbitrary dispro-
portionality” we not only place sentencing judges in difficult positions of 
conscience, we also risk eroding public confidence in the criminal justice 
system. 
